For nearly two decades, one question has haunted Iran-US diplomacy: Who should move first? Since the early ۲۰۰۰s, Washington and Tehran have repeatedly faced the same dilemma: Should Iran limit its nuclear activities before receiving economic relief, or should the United States ease pressure before expecting Iranian concessions? Yet the latest diplomatic crisis suggests that these may no longer be the right questions.
The real challenge is not who moves first. It is whether both sides can move together.
This question has become urgent again amid the latest dispute over the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has proposed reopening the waterway if Washington meets a series of conditions, including lifting the naval blockade, easing sanctions and providing guarantees against renewed attacks. Tehran argues that negotiations cannot begin under conditions of pressure and confrontation. Washington, however, insists that any renewed diplomatic process must address the nuclear issue from the beginning.
This disagreement represents the central problem of the current negotiations: both sides are demanding confidence-building measures before taking the first step. History shows that this dilemma has been addressed before through mechanisms based on reciprocal action.
The ۲۰۱۳ Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P۵+۱ – the five permanent United Nations Security Council members and Germany – was built around an interim approach in which both sides accepted limited and reversible measures. Iran agreed to restrictions on parts of its nuclear programme, including limits on enrichment levels and enhanced monitoring, while the US and its partners provided limited sanctions relief.
This approach later evolved into the ۲۰۱۵ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement established strict limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment, with a ۳.۶۷ percent cap, while expanding International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and providing sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear restrictions.
The implementation of the JCPOA followed a phased process. First came the agreement in July ۲۰۱۵, followed by Adoption Day in October, then Implementation Day in January ۲۰۱۶ after the IAEA verified Iran’s initial nuclear commitments. Only after verification did major sanctions relief begin.
The lesson from this experience is not that agreements based on sequencing always fail. Rather, it is that sequencing without durable political guarantees is vulnerable.
When the US withdrew from the JCPOA in ۲۰۱۸ and restored sanctions, Iran concluded that technical commitments alone were insufficient. From the Iranian perspective, the central problem became the absence of guarantees that a future agreement would survive political changes in Washington.
The US, however, has its own concerns. US policymakers argue that sanctions relief must be linked to verifiable Iranian commitments, especially regarding the nuclear programme. They fear that providing economic benefits too early could reduce Washington’s leverage.
This is the strongest argument against synchronised steps: critics argue that deep mistrust makes simultaneous implementation unrealistic. They warn that Iran could use economic relief to rebuild its capabilities, while Washington worries that it could lose its negotiating advantage.
But the answer is not to abandon reciprocity. The answer is to design stronger verification mechanisms. A workable model would not rely on trust alone. It would rely on verification.
For example, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz could be linked to a phased easing of restrictions, with each stage monitored by a third party. Qatar, given its role as a mediator, could help facilitate communication, while technical nuclear issues could remain under international verification through the IAEA.
The principle would be simple: every Iranian action would have a clearly defined US response, and every US step would have a measurable Iranian obligation.
This approach is more realistic than demanding unilateral concessions because it gives both governments political space at home. Neither side would appear to be surrendering under pressure; both could argue that they are receiving something in return.
Recent diplomacy has already moved partially in this direction. The June memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran, supported by Qatar and other mediators, attempted to create mechanisms for reducing tensions, including issues related to military operations and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Later discussions included technical committees and monitoring mechanisms designed to manage implementation.
Qatar’s mediation has also become increasingly significant. Doha has attempted to bridge the gap between Tehran’s demand for confidence-building measures before negotiations and Washington’s insistence that nuclear issues remain central.
The recent message from US Vice President JD Vance to Iranian officials also reflected this dilemma. Washington signalled willingness to explore renewed negotiations, but insisted that the nuclear issue remain part of the discussion. Tehran, meanwhile, has continued to argue that pressure must be reduced before broader talks can succeed.
The question facing both capitals is therefore not whether compromise is possible. It is whether they can design a process in which compromise becomes politically survivable.
The Middle East has already paid a high price for the belief that pressure alone can produce strategic outcomes. Military escalation, economic disruption and energy uncertainty have demonstrated the limits of confrontation.
The next diplomatic test will not be whether Iran or the US is willing to make the first concession. It will be whether both sides are prepared to accept a more difficult but more practical formula: not trust before action, but verified action that gradually creates trust.
The future of Iran-US diplomacy may depend on replacing the politics of the first move with the discipline of the synchronised move.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
